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ABSTRACT
We seek to answer the following question: To what extent can we
deduplicate replicated storage ? To answer this question, we design
ReDup, a secure storage system that provides users with strong
integrity, reliability, and transparency guarantees about data that is
outsourced at cloud storage providers. Users store multiple replicas
of their data at different storage servers, and the data at each storage
server is deduplicated across users. Remote data integrity mech-
anisms are used to check the integrity of replicas. We consider a
strong adversarial model, in which collusions are allowed between
storage servers and also between storage servers and dishonest
users of the system. A cloud storage provider (CSP) could store
less replicas than agreed upon by contract, unbeknownst to honest
users. ReDup defends against such adversaries by making replica
generation to be time consuming so that a dishonest CSP cannot
generate replicas on the fly when challenged by the users.
In addition, ReDup employs transparent deduplication, which
means that users get a proof attesting the deduplication level used
for their files at each replica server, and thus are able to benefit
from the storage savings provided by deduplication. The proof is
obtained by aggregating individual proofs from replica servers, and
has a constant size regardless of the number of replica servers. Our
solution scales better than state of the art and is provably secure
under standard assumptions.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Database and storage security; Se-
curity protocols; • Information systems → Deduplication; Dis-
tributed storage; • Computer systems organization→ Reliabil-
ity; Redundancy;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing storage to cloud storage providers (CSPs) has become
a popular and convenient practice. Despite its cost-saving bene-
fits, cloud storage remains rife with security issues [16]. There
are reported incidents of lost data or service unavailability due to
power outages [15], hardware failure, software bugs [14], external
or internal attacks, negligence, or administrator error. Moreover,
cloud infrastructures lack transparency and data owners have to
fully trust the CSPs. All these factors limit the suitability of cloud
platforms for applications that require long-term data integrity and
reliability. Of particular concern to data owners is that although
storage can be outsourced, the liability in case data is lost, damaged,
or stolen cannot be outsourced.
Several approaches can be used to ease these concerns. First, to
improve reliability, data can be stored redundantly by replicating it
across geographically dispersed cloud storage servers. Whenever
data is damaged at one replica server (RS), data can be retrieved from
healthy replication servers in order to repair the damaged data and
restore the desired level of redundancy. Second, the transparency
of cloud infrastructures can be improved by using an auditing
mechanism such as remote data integrity checking (RDIC) [4, 5, 9,
22], which allows data owners to efficiently check the integrity of
data stored at untrusted CSPs.
At the same time, a popular trend is that of data deduplication,
which allows CSPs to reduce their storage costs by exploiting com-
mon properties of files stored by different users. When different
users upload the same file at a CSP, deduplication ensures that only
one copy is stored. Recent studies show that cross-user data dedu-
plication can lead to significant savings in storage costs, ranging
from 50% to 95% [20, 21].
Although deduplication across multiple users’ files is economi-
cally beneficial for CSPs, the individual users whose files get dedu-
plicated do not benefit from these savings. Typically, each user
gets charged an amount that is proportional with the amount of
data stored and any savings due to deduplication with other users’
data are not passed to the end user. Recently, Armknecht et al. [3]
introduced transparent deduplication, which gives users full trans-
parency on the storage savings achieved through deduplication.
This enables a new pricing model which takes into account the level
of deduplication of the data: The more users store the same piece
of data, the lower each individual user gets charged for storing that
piece of data.
We wish to design a system that provides both integrity and
reliability (via RDIC and replication) as well as cost-efficient storage
via transparent deduplication, when faced with an economically
motivated adversary that controls some or all of the storage servers.
Adversarial servers will try to “cut corners” and gain an economic
advantage as long as it remains undetected. This can be achieved
either by using less storage than required to fulfill their contractual
obligations for replication, or by charging users according to a
deduplication level that is lower than the real one. To achieve this
goal, we are faced with twomain challenges that were not addressed
by previous work:
Challenge 1: Overcoming the replicate on the fly (ROTF) attack.
Previous work has established that the storage servers should be
required to store different and incompressible replicas [10, 12].
Otherwise, if all replicas are identical, an economically motivated
set of colluding servers may try to save storage by simply storing
only one replica and redirecting all data owner’s RDIC challenges
to the one server storing the replica. One approach to generate
different replicas is by encrypting the original file with different
keys. This mitigates the “redirection” attack described earlier: A
storage system cannot successfully pass RDIC challenges for the t
replicas without actually storing the t replicas.
However, in order to enable deduplication across users, the repli-
cas generated by two users for the same file for the same storage
server should be identical. For example, two users must generate
identical replicas H1 for storage server RS1, identical replicas H2
for storage server RS2, etc. To achieve this, users should use the
same keys to generate replicas for the same storage server. This
introduces the replicate on the fly (ROTF) attack, a novel attack
unique to this setting: if at least one user shares with the CSP the
keys used to generate replicas, then the CSP can recover and store
only the original file instead of storing the t replicas. The CSP can
then generate on the fly a particular replica to pass an RDIC chal-
lenge for that replica. This will hurt the reliability of the storage
system, because the CSP does not store t replicas, unbeknownst to
the client.
Challenge 2: Efficient transparent deduplication formultiple replicas.
Transparent deduplication has been investigated only when the
data is stored at a single cloud server [3]. When data is replicated
at multiple storage servers, the previous solution does not scale
well and transparent deduplication becomes more challenging to
achieve securely and efficiently.
Contributions: In this work, we propose ReDup, a secure storage
solution with Replication and transparent deDuplication. ReDup
provides users with strong integrity, reliability, and transparency
guarantees about data that is outsourced at cloud storage providers.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first proposal to provide
all these guarantees at the same time. Specifically, ReDup offers:
• Integrity: ReDup employs a remote data integrity checking
(RDIC) mechanism to allow users to check the integrity of
their outsourced data. Each user runs periodically a RDIC
protocol to check the health of her data at each replica server.
Whenever data damage is detected at a replica, data from
healthy replica servers can be used to restore the desired
replication level. Such a RDIC mechanism allows users to
assess the health of their data by periodically verifying the
integrity and replication level of their data.
• Reliability: ReDup provides data reliability by replicating a
user’s data at multiple storage servers that are geograph-
ically dispersed. Since different users may have different
reliability needs, ReDup offers multiple replication levels
and allows users to choose a replication level suitable for
their needs. We consider a more realistic adversarial model
which includes not only collusions between storage servers,
but also between storage servers and users of the system.
This introduces a novel attack, the replicate on the fly (ROTF)
attack, which allows the CSP to store only one copy of the
data and generate replicas on the fly to respond to RDIC
challenges. To defend against the ROTF attack, we make
the replica generation be time consuming and we enhance
the standard RDIC challenge-response model to include an
additional check regarding the time needed to generate the
RDIC proof. In this way, dishonest CSPs that try to generate
replicas on the fly will not be able to pass the RDIC chal-
lenges. In ReDup, replicas are generated from the original
file by applying a novel shortcut-free time consuming function
(SFTCF), which we define formally and then instantiate with
a butterfly construction.
• Efficient and transparent deduplication for multiple replicas:
When a user’s data is replicated at multiple servers, ReDup
provides a proof to the user attesting the deduplication level
that occurs at each replica server. The proof is obtained by ag-
gregating individual deduplication level proofs from replica
servers, and has a constant size regardless of the number
of replica servers. Users are charged inversely proportional
to the deduplication level of each of their replicas. ReDup
reconciles the seemingly contradictory notions of replication
and deduplication: The data of each user is replicated at mul-
tiple servers to increase reliability, whereas deduplication
is applied independently at each replication server across
different users’ data to reduce storage costs.
• Collusion resistance: These guarantees hold even in the pres-
ence of collusion between replica servers or between replica
servers and users.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2
we present background information and related work. We describe
the system and adversarial model in Section 3, along with the secu-
rity guarantees sought by the system. In Section 4 we provide some
preliminaries for our basic building blocks. A solution overview
of the protocol is depicted in Section 5 and its full description is
described in Section 6. Section 7 analyses the security of ReDup
and finally we conclude in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Remote data integrity checking formultiple replicas. Remote
data integrity checking (RDIC) [4, 17, 22] is a mechanism that allows
to check the integrity of data stored at an untrusted cloud storage
provider (CSP). A data owner uploads at the CSP their data together
with metadata consisting of a set of verification tags, and then
periodically challenges the CSP to provide a proof about the health
of the data. The CSP is able to create such a proof based on the data
and the metadata initially uploaded by the owner.
To ensure data reliability over time, the data owner creates mul-
tiple replicas of the data and stores them at multiple storage servers.
The data owner then uses RDIC to periodically check the health of
each replica, and if a replica is found corrupt, data from the other
healthy servers is used to restore the desired redundancy level in
the system [10, 12]. Previous work has established that the storage
servers should be required to store different and incompressible
replicas [10, 12].
Transparent Deduplication. Armknecht et al. [3] introduced the
notion of transparency for deduplicated storage: The cloud provides
to users proofs that attest the level of deduplication across users
employed by the cloud over their files. This enables a new pric-
ing model which takes into account the level of deduplication of
the data, allowing end users to get the benefits of deduplication.
Users are protected against a cloud provider that uses a certain
deduplication level, but charges users based on a lower level.
The solution lies in a Merkle tree tailored for this application,
which allows an honest user to verify a) how many users have also
uploaded the same file and b) that information about the user’s
file has been correctly incorporated in the bill issued by the cloud.
Although this solution is efficient when files are stored at a single
storage server, when translated to a multiple replica scenario it
becomes inefficient as it would require multiple instances of the
Merkle tree, one per each replica.
2.1 Other Related Work
Current literature in remote data integrity checking protocols either
does not address deduplication in amultiple replica scenario, or does
not consider the challenging multi-user scenario with collusions
between users and economically-motivated replica servers.
Multi-User with Tags Deduplication. Vasilopoulos et al. [24]
proposed a combination of existing deduplication schemes with
proofs of retrievability to further reduce the storage cost of tags
for identical blocks. In their model, there is a single replica storage
policy and users do not collude with the cloud provider. Armknecht
et al. [2] considered the same model, whereby a single replica server
stores only once tags coming from different users for the same data
block. The solution lies on shared aggregated tags based on BLS
signatures [8] incorporating the secret keys of all users and can
tolerate collusions between users and a malicious cloud storage
provider: Deleting a deduplicated block tag and obtaining the secret
key from a malicious user cannot help the cloud to reconstruct the
tag without the participation of all the other users. Their model,
however, does not consider providing both multiple replica storage
and deduplication.
Replicated Storage. Curtmola et al. [12] considered a model
in which a single user stores replicas of a file at multiple storage
servers to tolerate faults. The user relies on an RDIC protocol to
verify faithful storage at each replica server. However, this scenario
does not consider multiple users nor the deduplication functionality.
Armknecht et al. [1] considered a multiple replica storage scenario
enhanced with proofs of correct replication by the user. This work
differs in two fundamental aspects from ours: 1) its focus is towards
delegating the replica computation to the CSP, and 2) the tunable
puzzles used in the replication scheme rely on the assumption that
computation is more expensive than storage, which may not always
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Figure 1: An example of deduplication applied to multiple replicas.
be applicable. Other work [7, 13, 25] seeks to establish the physical
location of replicas. Our goal is different.
3 SYSTEM AND ADVERSARIAL MODEL
3.1 System Model
A set of users,U = U1,U2,U3, . . . ,Um , store their files at a cloud
storage provider (CSP). To ensure data reliability and protect against
data damage, the CSP exposes an interface that allows users to
store multiple replicas of their files at different replication servers.
Each user uses remote data integrity checking (RDIC) to check the
integrity of their replicas stored at each replica server; in case data
damage is detected at a replica server, the user leverages replicas
from other healthy replica servers to restore the desired level of
redundancy.
Replication level. As users have different budgets and needs, the
CSP allows users to choose the desired replication level (rl) for their
files. Without loss of generality, we assume the CSP offers a fixed
number of replication levels (e.g., in practice it may offer three
levels, corresponding to high, medium, and low reliability). Fig. 1(a)
shows an example with three users choosing different replication
levels, rl1 = 4, rl2 = 3, rl3 = 2. User U1, who chose rl1 = 4, will
generate four replicas H1,H2,H3,H4 and the corresponding RDIC
verification tags vt11, vt
2
1, vt
3
1, vt
4
1, and will store them at replication
servers RS1,RS2,RS3 and RS4. Whereas userU3, who chose rl3 = 2,
will generate two replicasH1,H2 and RDIC verification tags vt13, vt
2
3,
and store them at servers RS1,RS2, respectively.
We assume identical files will result in identical encrypted ci-
phertexts when stored at the CSP. This assumption is typical in
the secure storage deduplication literature and ensures that if two
users want to store the same file, the replicas generated for the file
will be identical, thus allowing deduplication to be applied at each
replica server. The mechanism used to achieve this is outside the
scope of the paper, but we enumerate here existing approaches:
Users can rely on variants of convergent encryption to derive an
encryption key securely with a multiparty computation protocol
between users [19]. Or, deduplication can occur with the aid of a
semi-trusted server and message lock encryption [18].
Deduplication level.Whenever possible, the CSP employs dedu-
plication across different users’ files at each replication server: If
multiple users store identical files, the CSP keeps only one copy.
In the example of Fig. 1(b), servers RS1,RS2,RS3 perform dedu-
plication for the files H1,H2,H3, and the deduplication level (dl) is
dl1 = 3, dl2 = 3, dl3 = 2, respectively. Server RS4 does not perform
deduplication, as it already stores only one copy of file H4. Notice
that deduplication occurs at each replication server independently,
meaning that different copies of the same file will be dispersed
along replica servers to ensure reliability, but at each replica server
deduplication is applied and only one copy of multiple identical
files is stored.
Pricing model. The system divides time into epochs (e.g., one
epoch is one day) and users get charged at the end of each epoch.
A user’s bill for each epoch is directly proportional to the chosen
replication level and inversely proportional to the deduplication
level that occurs at each replica server. This means that if a user
is uploading a file at a replica server and that file is already stored
by r other users, then each of the r + 1 users that store the file will
get charged an amount that is r + 1 smaller compared to the case
when no deduplication occurs.
To prevent a dishonest CSP from charging users more by claim-
ing a lower deduplication level, the system employs transparent
deduplication: the CSP provides to each user at the end of each
epoch a proof that attests to the deduplication level that occured at
each replication server.
System overview.As depicted in Fig. 2, the system consists of four
protocols: Setup,Replicate,RDIC, and AttestDedup. Each userUj ,
with 1 ≤ j ≤ m, runs these protocols. We give an overview of these
protocols next:
Setup(1λ ,n, rlj ): During Setup, each user Uj chooses rlj , the
replication level for her files. Users also generate the secret keys
fk, kj , according to the security parameter λ, that will be used
during the other protocols of the system.
Replicate(F, fk, kj , rlj ): Each userUj runs the Replicate protocol
to generate replicas H1,H2, · · · ,Hrlj for file F, using the key fk.
Identical files by different users are stored only once at each replica
server, but are stored multiple times according to the replication
level choice rlj to ensure reliability. User Uj also uses key kj to
compute the set of RDIC verification tags vtij on top of each replica
Hi , with 1 ≤ i ≤ rlj . Finally, Uj uploads replica Hi and verification
tags vtij at server RSi .
RDIC(F, < Uj : Q >, < RSi : σi >): Each user Uj engages in a
remote data integrity checking protocol (RDIC) with replica server
RSi to check faithful storage of the replica fileHi , for 1 ≤ i ≤ rlj . In
the RDIC protocol, the user issues a challenge Q to a replica server,
and the server responds with a proof σi that attests the integrity
of the replica stored at that server (this proof is constructed using
the challenged replica file and its corresponding verification tags).
The user verifies the correctness of the proof received from the
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Figure 2: Setup, RDIC, AttestDedup for a user U1 storing a file F.
server. Unlike in a standard RDIC protocol, the user performs an
additional check in order to prevent the ROTF attack: whether the
server’s response time is below a threshold T .
AttestDedup(ep,Uj , F): Each user Uj runs the AttestDedup pro-
tocol during each epoch ep to verify the CSP’s claim about the
deduplication level employed for the user’s replica files during that
epoch. During each time epoch, the CSP issues a bill to each user
based on the replication level chosen by the user for her files, and
on whether the user’s replica files benefited from deduplication.
The bill includes a proof that allows the client to verify the dedu-
plication level of its replicas. The AttestDedup protocol prevents
dishonest CSPs from claiming a lower deduplication level that the
one deployed at its servers in order to charge users a higher bill.
3.2 Adversarial Model
We assume an adversary that controls some or all of the storage
servers and is rational and economically motivated. Adversarial
servers will try to cheat and “cut corners” as long as cheating re-
mains undetected and it provides an economic benefit. For example,
the CSP may use less storage than required to fulfill its contractual
obligations for replication, or it may charge users according to a
deduplication level that is lower than the real one. An economically
motivated adversary captures many practical settings in which ma-
licious servers will not cheat and risk their reputation, unless they
can achieve a clear financial gain. Moreover, the communication
between users and the CSP is done over an authenticated channel.
The ROTF attack. In addition to controlling storage servers, the
adversary may also corrupt users of the system. As such, users
may collude with the CSP to share their secret key material. For
example, a user may share with the CSP the secret key material used
to generate replicas. This allows the CSP to recover the original
file and only store that file instead of storing multiple replicas as
required by contract. Whenever a user sends an RDIC challenge to
check a particular replica, the CSP can generate that replica on the
fly based on the original file and on the key material obtained from
the colluding user. As described in previous work [10, 11], a storage
server that is challenged and does not possess its replica, can either
forward the challenge to a server that stores the file (which will
generate the needed replica on the fly), or can retrieve the file in
order to generate the challenged replica on the fly. By allowing
collusions between the CSP and its users, our adversarial model is
stronger and more realistic compared to previous work.
We note that users are willing to collaborate in order to benefit
from cost reduction due to deduplication. However, we want the
system to be resilient to the possibility that some users may be
malicious and may collude with the untrusted CSP.
Incorrect deduplication level. A CSP may advertise appealing
costs for deduplicated files: Users are charged inversely propor-
tional to the number of times a file has been stored. However, a
dishonest CSP may try to claim a lower deduplication level in order
to increase its revenue.
3.3 Security Guarantees
Inspired by the aforementioned adversarial model, we define the
security guarantees of our system. They protect an honest user
Uj from a coalition of malicious replica servers and users who
will try not to follow the contractual agreement with respect to
1) faithful storage of file replicas at rlj replica servers and 2) the
correct deduplication level used forUj ’s files.
3.3.1 Collusion Resistant Replica Integrity. The CSP must prove
to a user Uj that it faithfully stores rlj replicas of the user’s files
in their entirety. In contrast with multiple replica RDIC protocols
designed for single users [1, 12], ReDup seeks to provide data
integrity of each replica file when confronted with ROTF attacks
that involve collusion betweenmalicious users and dishonest replica
servers. More specifically, we say that ReDup provides:
• SG1: Replica integrity, if each replica server RSi can convince
a user Uj with high probability that the replica Hi remains
intact in its entirety, for 1 ≤ i ≤ rlj .
• SG2: Storage Allocation, if the amount of data stored by a
CSP for a file F of size |F| on a replication level rl is at least
rl|F|.
SG1 protects the users from a CSP that does not store replica
files in their entirety. SG2 protects users from a CSP that does not
respect its contractual obligations of storing rlj replicas and tries to
reduce its costs by storing less replicas. Together, SG1 and SG2 im-
ply that the CSP faithfully stores all rlj replica copies of a file F. We
capture these two guarantees under the Collusion Resistant Repli-
cas Integrity (CR2P) property, formulated with a standard security
game between the adversary and the challenger:
In our adversarial model, we assumeA can collude with another
userU or another replica server RS. During the game, we allow A
to have access to the oracles, which provide all the secret transcripts.
We denote by Oabc (k, l ,m;x ,y, z) the abc oracle, which takes as
inputs the parameters k, l ,m and executes its code with local vari-
ables x ,y, z, which are unknown to the caller–the adversaryA. We
denote by ai a list with i elements. LetU ′ be the set of corrupted
users andU −U ′ be the set of honest users. We use RS′ to denote
the corrupted replica servers and RS − RS′ the faithful servers.
We useUi →U to denote the insertion of elementUi into the set
U . A has access to the following oracles:
• U ′,RS′ ← OSetup (uidm−1, sidt ;m, rlj ):Whenever invoked
with parameters a list of users ids uidm−1 and replica servers
ids sidt , the OSetup oracle stores the ids to the appropriate
setsU ′,RS′, denoting the list of corrupted users and replica
servers, respectively.
• Hi ← OGenReplica (F, j; fk, i ): The OGenReplica oracle takes as
input a file F and a user id j . It first checks ifUj ∈ U ′. If that
user is corrupted then it outputs the replica copy Hi for the
replica server RSi for that user on file F using the key fk. The
oracle keeps track of the uploaded files and for similar files
it uses the same key in order to simulate the deduplication
process. Finally OGenReplica also stores Hi → H in the list H
and sends Hi to A.
• vtij ← OTagFile (Hi , j; kj ): The OTagFile oracle on input Hi
and j first checks if Uj ∈ U ′ and Hi ∈ H . If both hold, then
computes the tags vtij using kj and forwards them to A.
• c jF ← OChallenge (F, j; kj ): The OChallenge oracle outputs a
challenge for file F for the userUj ∈ U −U ′.
• β ← OVerify (proof j,iF ,τi ;T ): TheOVerify oracle takes as input
a proof proof j,iF and a response time τi . It outputs β = 0 if
either the proof is not valid or τi > T , otherwise it sets β = 1.
During the GameCR2PA game the adversary communicates with the
oracles in order to create the environment to be challenged upon
as follows:
GameCR
2P
A
1 : U ′, RS′ ← AOSetup //A compromises users and servers
2 : for i = 1...rlj do
3 : Hi ← AOGenReplica (F, j ;fk,i )//A learns replica copies
4 : vtij ← AO
TagFile (Hi , j ;kj )//A asks for verifications tags
5 : c jF ← AO
Challenge (F, j ;kj )//A is challenged
6 : proof j,iF , τi ← A (U ′, RS′, F, Hi , vtij , c jF )
7 : βi ← OVerify (proof j,iF , τi ;T )
8 : return β =
∧
βi //Experiment is successful if β
?
=1
Finally the game outputs a value β ∈ {0, 1}. We define the success
probabilities of an adversary A playing the GameCR2PA game as:
SuccCR
2P
A = Pr[Game
CR2P
A = 1]. The heuristic is that if the output
of the experiment equals 1 then A should posses all replica copies
H1 . . .Hrlj . In order to formulate that heuristic we employ the no-
tion of the extractor E, which can communicate with the adversary
and rewind her at different steps in order to extract a file F from
all replica copies H1 . . .Hrlj . We define the success probability of
the extractor E as follows: SuccExtractA = Pr[F = Ffh |Ffh ← EA].
Definition 1. (CR2P: Collusion Resistant Replica Possession)ReDup
system guarantees Collusion Resistant Replica Possession if under
any collusions for a set users |U | who have stored the file F in rlj
replica servers RS1,RS2,RS3, · · · ,RSrlj and for any PPT adversary
A, for any security parameter λ and a negligible quantity negl (λ ),
it holds that:
Pr[SuccExtractA ≤ negl (λ ) ∧ SuccCR
2P
A > negl (λ )
: E
U ′,RS′,F,Hi ,vtij ,c jF←− A ↔ GameCR2PA ] ≤ γ
Intuitively, the CR2P definition establishes an upper bound γ
on the event that an adversary A wins the GameCR2PA game with
non-negligible probability and that an extractor E is not able to
extract the file after interacting with A.
3.3.2 Deduplication Correctness. An economically motivated
dishonest CSP may employ a certain deduplication level, but may
charge users a higher amount by claiming a lower deduplication
level. Previous work uses an authenticated data structure (ADS) to
accumulate the users’ file deduplication levels, and provides to each
user a proof of membership in this ADS. To ensure deduplication
correctness, it suffices to provide:
• dc1: Proofs attesting that each of the user’s files has been
included in the ADS.
• dc2: A proof attesting the correct size of the ADS.
We capture these two guarantees under the Deduplication Correct-
ness property:
Definition 2. (Deduplication Correctness) During an epoch ep,
each userUj stores file replicas at replica serversRS1,RS2,RS3, · · · ,RSrlj
and the deduplication level for a file F at each replica serverRSi is dliF.
The system guarantees Deduplication Correctness if, for any epoch
ep, an honest user U who runs the AttestDedup(ep,U , F) algorithm
will detect with high probability if a dishonest CSP claims a dedu-
plication level dli
′
F , dl
i
F for file F at replica server RSi .
4 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present building blocks that will be used in our
construction.
4.1 Shortcut Free Time and Consuming
Function (SFTCF)
We put forward the definition of a Shortcut Free and Time Con-
suming Function S . S is a symmetric trapdoor function which takes
input I with v blocks and outputs H with v blocks. Moreover S
should adhere to the shortcut free property which states that the
holder of any output H ′ with v ′ < v blocks will not help her to
recover the remaining v − v ′ output blocks in time less than a
threshold T , even when it knows the trapdoor of S . Finally the
running time of S should be considerably greater than the running
time of a well known functionality G. The properties of a SFTCF
are:
(1) Shortcut Freeness: Storing any intermediate state st, which
is smaller than the original size v of the input, does not
result in evaluation time smaller than the running time of S
on the original input of size v: S cannot be decomposed in
S1, S2, . . . , Sv , such that S (v ) = S1 () ◦ S2 ()◦, . . . , ◦Sv ()
(2) G-Detectable TimeConsumption: Evaluation of the func-
tion requires computational resources, which results in a
considerable detectable time for its evaluation. That is, for
another function G whose complexity is ΩG (v ) we say that
S guarantees G-Detectable Time Consumption if ΩS (v ) ≫
ΩG (v ).
Security. An SFTCF is correct if it allows the recovery of the
original input I from the output H . Evaluating S and S−1 cannot be
done without having the secret key.
Definition 3. An SFTCF S is secure if it assures shortcut free-
ness and is G-Detectable Time Consuming for any G with ΩS (v ) ≫
ΩG (v ).
For readers familiar with the hourglass function primitive [23],
we clarify that our goal in the definition of the SFTCF function is to
adapt the security requirements of the hourglass primitive in order
to fit the needs of our protocol. The goal of the hourglass function in
[23] is to ensure storage of a file in an appropriate format, whereas
ReDup’s goal is to attest faithful storage of all replicas in case of
collusions between users and the CSP.
4.1.1 SFTCF Instantiation. We instantiate the SFTCF S with
the butterfly construction proposed by Dijk et al. [23]. Let I and
H be the input and output domain consisting of v block files. The
output is computed in d = log2v levels. At each level, an atomic
operationw takes as input pairs of blocks and outputs another pair,
acting as input for the next level. A PRP such as AES can be used
for w . More formally S : Iv → Hv . The input blocks are denoted
as I1[u] and the final output blocks as Hd [u], with u ∈ [1, . . . ,v].
Overall,w is invoked v2 log2v times (
v
2 times at each level).
Shortcut Freeness: An example of a SFTCF instantiation is
shown in Fig. 3, with v = 8 blocks and d = 3. Each of the blocks
on the last level is the result of mixing all of the v input blocks.
The SFTCF meets the shortcut freeness requirements because a
malicious cloud server that is missing even one block on the last
level cannot evaluate S in less time than O (v ).
G-Detectability: As shown in [23], the butterfly-based hour-
glass construction induces considerable computation overhead.
More specifically, setting G be the response time of a benign cloud,
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Figure 3: Example of SFTCF based on a butterfly construction, with
v = 8 input blocks.
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Figure 4: ReDup uses optimized Merkle trees for deduplication level proofs. The CSP offers 3 deduplication levels, rp1 = 3, rp2 = 5, rp3 = 10.
Three users U1, U2, U3 choose replication levels rl1 = 3, rl2 = 5 and rl3 = 10, respectively. There will be 3 trees corresponding to 3 replica server
groups: aggrp1 = {RS1, RS2, RS3 } for U1, U2 and U3, aggrp2 = {RS4, RS5 } for U2 and U3, and aggrp3 = {RS6, RS7, RS8, RS9, RS10 } for U3. Grey nodes
marked H0 are “zero” leaves obtained by hashing the 0 value. During verification, for example, U2 receives the following proofs for the file
corresponding to the root1 tree: for dc1 h1, h6, and for dc2 h5.
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Figure 5: A CARDIAC example with deduplication level 3: leaves
h1, h2, h3 correspond to three users U1, U2, U3 who store the same
file. The tree contains one “zero” leaf H0. The deduplication level
proof for user U2 consists of: dc1) the sibling path for h2, and dc2)
the rightmost non-zero leaf h3 and the sibling path for h3.
the running time ofG is 0.077 seconds on average according to [23,
Table 2] and the corresponding running time for a malicious cloud,
who tries to run the butterfly hourglass function, equals 18.065
seconds on average for a 2GB file. This experimental evaluation
supports the detectability property of our SFTCF.
Alternatively, an SFTCF may be be instantiated with the con-
struction based on tunable puzzles proposed by Armknecht et al. [1].
However, the design of their protocol does not explicitly provide
provisions against ROTF attacks, since the authors make certain
assumptions regarding the higher price of computation costs com-
pared with storage costs, which may not hold in all systems and is
subject to change over time.
4.2 Merkle Hash Trees
We use a standard Merkle hash tree, which uses a collision resistant
hash function W : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ to compute its root with the MHT
algorithm. To prove membership for a leaf element, a prover calls
ProveMT which computes the corresponding sibling path and the
verifier uses CheckPath to verify the membership proof.
5 ReDup OVERVIEW
We give an overview of ReDup, focusing on the challenges ad-
dressed by our system:
CH1a (Resiliency against collusions between servers): ReDup
encrypts the replicas with different keys. As such, when RSi does
not store its replica copy Hi , it cannot use the replica copy from
another server RSj to answer RDIC challenges on the fly because
RSj stores a different replica copy Hj .
CH1b (Resiliency against collusions between a user and replica
servers): Each user Uj generates each replica file by applying the
SFTCF function S on the original file F with a different key for
each replica. The user then computes verification tags over each
replica and uploads the tags and replicas to the replica servers.
The user runs an RDIC protocol with each replica server to ensure
faithful storage of each replica file by each replica server. In contrast
with previous RDIC protocols, ReDup uses an RDIC verification
procedure that succeeds only if the time to verify the integrity of
each replica copy is below a threshold value T , which is greater
than the time to evaluate S (F ). As such, Uj can detect malicious
behavior of a replica server RSi that colludes with a dishonest user
to answer the RDIC challenges without storing the replica file.
CH2 (Scalable transparent deduplication for multiple replicas):
To ensure the correctness of the deduplication level, we adapt the
solution based on accumulation Merkle trees used in CARDIAC( [3],
Section 3.2.1). In CARDIAC, the CSP publishes in each epoch the
root of a Merkle tree for each deduplicated file. The Merkle tree
has two types of leaves: “non-zero” and “zero” leaves. Each “non-
zero” leaf corresponds to a user whose file has been deduplicated,
and contains a hash of the user identifier, the file identifier and
the epoch. The deduplication level equals the number of non-zero
leaves. The rest of the leaves are “zero” leaves, i.e., hashes of the
0 value. The proof of deduplication level correctness for a user
consists of two parts: dc1) a membership proof, which establishes
that this user’s file was included in the Merkle tree and dc2) a proof
attesting the correct number of non-zero leaves, which consists
RSi Replica server i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (n is the number of replica servers)
Uj User j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m (m is the number of users)
fu File block u, 1 ≤ u ≤ v (there are v blocks in the original file F)
S Shortcut Free and Time Consuming Function (SFTCF)
fk Secret key used by SFTCF S to generate file replicas
kj Secret key used byUj to compute the tags over her file replicas
W A hash function W : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ
vtij Verification tags created by userUj for her replica stored at RSi
dliF Deduplication level of file F at RSi
rlj Replication level for userUj
f h Fixed height of the Merkle tree
nz Index of the rightmost non-zero leaf of a Merkle tree
Z F A list of users owning file with id F
l FU A list of hashes of each element of the list Z
F
rootF The root of the Merkle tree for file F
hF0 The signed root of the Merkle tree for file F
apmFj The authentication path for node hj of the Merkle tree with root h
F
0
hFnz The rightmost non-zero leaf of the Merkle tree with root hF0
apcFj Rightmost non-zero leaf authentication path with tree root h
F
0
π F,epj Uj ’s proof of deduplication correctness at ep epoch for file F
Table 1: Notation used throughout this section.
of the rightmost non-zero leaf and its sibling path. Fig. 5 shows a
CARDIAC accumulation tree example.
Naive solution. A naive adaptation of CARDIAC to a multi-
replica scenario does not scale well with different replication level
policies per user. Imagine 10 replica servers, one file and three users
with three different replication levels: rl1 = 3, rl2 = 5, rl3 = 10 for
usersU1,U2,U3. ACSP following the naive CARDIAC approach has
to maintain 10 different trees, one per each replica server. To check
the deduplication level,U3 has to obtain proofs for 10 different trees,
which implies a tenfold increase in the communication bandwidth
and in the proof computation and verification time.
Optimized solution. Recall that each userUj chooses her repli-
cation level rlj out of a fixed number of replication levels, e.g., 3
levels corresponding to low, medium, and high reliability. Our so-
lution reduces the number of Merkle trees per file from rlj to a
constant number (e.g., 3), which is the number of different repli-
cation levels offered by the CSP. We aggregate different replica
server Merkle trees which accumulate the same users and thus
have the same structure. In the example provided in Fig. 4, userU3
who chose a replication level of 10 gets only 3 proofs instead of 10
proofs as in the naive application of CARDIAC.
6 THE ReDup SYSTEM
The full details of the ReDup system are presented in Figures 6
and 7. We start by presenting in Table 1 commonly used notation
throughout this section.
A file F consists of file blocks f1, f2, ..., fv . The CSP keeps track
of two data structures, FL and RL. FL serves as a file log that records
which users have stored a specific file. FL is abstracted as a dic-
tionary keyed by the id of a file F. FL[F].append(Uj ) denotes the
insertion of userUj under the key F and FL[F] returns a tuple set
with the id of all users who have stored the file F. RL is a log dictio-
nary that contains the replication level choice of a user and the files
stored by that user: RL[Uj ] = (rl : rlj , f : ()). We describe next the
four phases of the protocol, Setup,Replicate,RDIC,AttestDedup.
Setup: Each user Uj runs the Setup algorithm, which outputs
RDIC tagging keys kj (Fig. 6, Setup algorithm, line 1). Users agree
on a key fk to compute the replica copies. Furthermore, each user
chooses its replication level rlj and forwards it to the CSP (line 2),
which in turn stores it in the RL dictionary (line 3).
Replicate: Each user runs this algorithm, which outputs the
replica copies and the corresponding verification tags to be stored
at each replica server RSi . A key fki is derived from fk for each
replica server RSi with the use of a PRF (Fig. 6, Replicate algorithm,
line 4). The replica copy Hi for RSi is then obtained by applying
the SFTCF S to the blocks of the original file f1, f2, . . . , fv (line
5). To generate the RDIC verification tags, ReDup can use any ex-
isting RDIC protocol with private verification [4, 17, 22] (line 6)
using secret keys kj . However, unlike previous RDIC protocols, the
TagFile is not applied directly on the file F but on the output Hi of
the SFTCF function S .
RDIC: ReDup uses the standard Challenge,Prove and Verify al-
gorithms of an interactive RDIC protocol to check the integrity of
the replicas. The user provides as input the challengeQ and theCSP
produces a proof σi for each replica server. In contrast with the pre-
vious RDIC protocols, ReDup uses an RDIC Verify procedure that
succeeds only if the time to verify the integrity of each replica copy
is below a threshold valueT > Time(S (F)), where Time(S (F)) is the
running time of S (F). Assuming a computationally-bounded CSP
and depending on the client needs,T can be set asT >> Time(S (F))
to detect large corruptions, or as T ≈ Time(S (F)) to detect small
corruptions.
AttestDedup: The CSP computes the Merkle trees in each epoch
with theAttestDedup.P algorithm (Fig. 7, AttestDedup.P algorithm,
lines 1-14 ). In lines 6-9 the correct symmetric replica servers for
rp are accumulated in the leaf of each user and finally the leaf ZF
is being hashed with a collision resistant hash function W to output
the digest lFU . For the remaining 2
f h − |lFU | nodes, zero leaves are
computed as W(0) to fill in the tree of height f h. Once all the leaves
of the tree have been computed, the CSP calls the MHT algorithm,
which computes the root of the Merkle tree rootF (line 12 ) and
signs it hF0 = Sig(root
F) (line 13 ).
To compute the proof for a userUj , the CSP computes the sibling
paths apmFj for all the trees the user has been included in (line
4 ), using the standard Merkle tree membership proof (ProveMT
algorithm). To establish a correct deduplication level for the file (i.e,
number of non-zero leaves), theCSP fetches the rightmost non-zero
leaf node hFnz of each tree Uj has been included in and computes
its sibling path apcFj as well (lines 5-6 ). Finally, it sends the proof
π
F,ep
j = (apm
F
j ,h
F
nz , apc
F
j , f h, |lFU |) toUj .
Upon receipt of the proof πF,epj , Uj invokes AttestDedup.V al-
gorithm (cf. Fig. 8) to verify the proof. It first checks whether the
claimed deduplication level is consistent with the zero leafs for a
tree of height f h (AttestDedup.V algorithm, line 4). For dc1, which
ensures that the user id was included in the tree(s) of the corre-
sponding files,Uj calls CheckPath to verify the consistency of the
returned sibling path apmFj (AttestDedup.V algorithm, line 5). For
dc2, which atests the deduplication level |lFU |, Uj first verifies the
paths of all hFnz with the CheckPath Merkle tree algorithm (line
6). Afterwards,Uj checks if the CheckPath algorithm on input the
(2f h − 1) − |lFU | nodes computed as zero leaf nodes, along with
• Setup(1λ ,n, rlj ): // Run byUj
1 : (kj , fk) ← KeyGen(1λ, n)
2 : Uj sends rlj to CSP
3 : CSP sets RL[Uj ].rl = rlj
//CSP stores the replication level in the log file RL
• Replicate(F, fk, kj , rlj ): // Run byUj
1 : for (i = 1, i ≤ rlj , i + +) do
2 : Hi ← GenReplica(i, F, fk) :
3 : parse F as f1, f2, . . . , fv
4 : fki = PRFfk (i )
//Derive the key for replica to be stored at RSi
5 : Hi = Sfki (f1, f2, . . . , fv )
//Run the SFTCF S on the original file blocks
6 : vtij ← TagFile(Hi , kj )
7 : Uj sends Hi , vtij to RSi
8 : CSP runs FLi [F].append(Uj )
• RDIC(F, < Uj : Q >, < RSi : σi >):
1 : for (i = 1, i ≤ rlj , i + +) do
2 : Q ← Challenge(l, n)
3 : σi ← Prove(Q, Hi , vtij )
4 : τi ← (Time(Verify(σi ) ≤ T )) : 1?0
5 : if
∧
τi
?
= 1 return 1 else return 0
• AttestDedup(ep,Uj , F):// Run byUj and CSP
1 : for (ep ∈ T ∧ F ∈ FL ∧Uj ∈ U ) do
2 : π F,epj ← AttestDedup.P(ep, Uj , F)
3 : {0, 1} ← AttestDedup.V(π F,epj )
Figure 6: The ReDup system.
their sibling nodes, verifies correctly the Merkle tree (line 7). If all
the checks succeed, AttestDedup.V outputs 1 for successful verifi-
cation.
Discussion. In ReDup, users encrypt their files before uploading
them to the CSP. As such, there is no need for the CSP to encrypt
data at rest. We note that, consistent with the secure deduplica-
tion literature, the IND-CPA or IND-CCA definitions for privacy
cannot be achieved. Thus, we inherit the security guarantee for
deduplicated messages: PRIV-CDA (privacy under chosen distribu-
tion attacks) [6], which guarantees that encryption of unpredictable
messages should be indistinguishable from a random message of
the same length. We also note that, if users choose weak keys to en-
crypt their files, the CSP can apply semantically secure encryption
for data at rest independently on top of ReDup.
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1. If S is a Shortcut Free and G-Detectable Time Con-
suming Function (SFTCF), then ReDup guarantees Collusion Resis-
tant Replicas Possession (CR2P) against a rational and economically
motivated CSP and any colluding user.
π
ep
j ← AttestDedup.P(ep,Uj , f h): // Run by the CSP
1 : pp = 1
2 : foreach rp do
// For replication levels 3, 5, 10, at every loop rp = 3, 5, 10
3 : for (F ∈ RL[Uj ].f ) do
// For every file fetch the id thereof from RL
4 : for U ∈ FL[F] do
// Retrieve the set of users who stored the file
5 : Z F = U | |ep
6 : for (j = pp ; j ≤ rp) do
// Aggregate all the RS of that replication level group
7 : if (RL[U].rl > j ) continue
8 : Z F+ = | |RSj
// Aggregate all the replica servers.
9 : lFU+ = W(Z
F)
// Using a CRHF W hash the leaf value.
10 : for (z = 1; z ≤ (2f h − 1) − |lFU |; z + +)
11 : lFU+ = W(0)
// Pad with 0 leaf nodes
12 : rootF ← MHT(lFU )
// Build the merkle tree for lF,rlU
13 : hF0 = Sig(root
F)
// Sign the root
14 : pp = rp
1 : foreach rp do
// For replication levels 3, 5, 10, at every loop rp = 3, 5, 10
2 : if (RL[Uj ].rl < rp) continue
3 : for (F ∈ RL[Uj ].f ) do
// For every file fetch the id thereof from RL
4 : apmFj ← ProveMT(hj , lFU )
// Compute the sibling path for Uj ’s leaf
5 : hFnz ← FetchR(hF0 )
// Fetch the rightmost non-zero leaf
6 : apcFj ← ProveMT(hFnz, lFU )
// Compute its sibling path
7 : π F,epj = (apm
F
j , h
F
nz, apc
F
j , f h, dl
rp
F )
8 : return π F,epj , ∀F ∈ RL[Uj ].f
Figure 7: The AttestDedup.P algorithm run by the CSP.
Proof. (Sketch) Let δui follow a Bernoulli distribution with suc-
cess probability δui denoting the probability A corrupts block fu
at replica server RSi and failure probability 1 − δui . Let Uuid be
the user who challenges the CSP. Then all the vrluid blocks have
{0, 1} ← AttestDedup.V(πF,epj ) : // Run byUj
1 : foreach rp do
// For replication levels 3, 5, 10, at every loop rp = 3, 5, 10
2 : if (RL[Uj ].rl < rp) continue
3 : for (F ∈ RL[Uj ].f ) do
// For every file fetch the id thereof from RL
4 : dlrpF + |zero leafs |
?
= 2f h
5 : {0, 1} ← CheckPath(hj , apmFj , hF0 )
//Check if Uj ’s file F was included
6 : {0, 1} ← CheckPath(hFnz, apcFj , hF0 )
//Test inclusion of rightmost non-zero leaf
7 : {0, 1} ← CheckZeroNodes(hF0 )
// Build up the tree starting from the zero nodes
8 : return (all checks == 1)?1 : 0
Figure 8: The verification algorithm for AttestDedup: The
Client verifies the proof.
corruption probability δui for u ∈ [1 . . .vrluid]. The success proba-
bility SuccCR2PA for A to pass a challenge of size l depends on the
failure probability 1 − δui and the success probability δui to corrupt
fu by outputting the correct challenge on time less than T . We
assume S is a secure SFTCF. The probability to correctly guess the
challenged blocks equals the probability to randomly guess the
output of S for each block of the challenge of size l , and is equal to
SuccCR
2P
A =
∏l
u=1 (1 − δui +
δui ϵ
2v ), where ϵ is a negligible probabil-
ity that corresponds to the event of evaluating S in time less than
T . From that we conclude that SuccCR2PA ≤ negl (λ ).
The extractor E simulates the OTagFile oracle. When A queries
the OTagFile oracle with input (Hi , uid), E first checks if uid ∈
U ′ and Hi ∈ H . If both hold then it computes the tags vtiuid and
forwards them to A. We assume A stores only s < vrluid blocks.
By storing we mean both the blocks and the verifications tags. Thus,
during the challenge,A has to correctly guess the blocks and tags of
the challenge. Let some s ′ < l , s blocks of the total l-block challenge
be stored byA. We denote by E1 the eventA correctly guesses the
remaining l − s ′ challenged blocks (which are not stored), E2 the
event A computes the responses for that challenge correctly and
E3 the event the OTagFile oracle outputs a special malicious output
h∗, from whichA can compute the remaining l − s ′ blocks and the
responses on the fly. Accordingly, the probabilities for E1,E2,E3
are p1,p2,p3, respectively.
Clearly, p1 = p2 = 2
l−s′
2v ,p3 =
1
2q , where q is the digest size
of the OTagFile response. As such, SuccExtractA = 1 − (p1p2 + (1 −
p1p2)p3) = 1−p3+p1p2 (p3−1) = 1− 12q + 2
2(l−s′)
22v (
1
2q −1), meaning
that SuccExtractA > negl (λ ). As such, Pr[Succ
Extract
A ≤ negl (λ ) ∧
SuccCR
2P
A > negl (λ )] ≤ negl (λ ). □
Theorem 2. If W is a collision-resistant hash function, thenReDup
guarantees Deduplication Correctness against a rational and eco-
nomically motivated adversaryA who controls all the replica servers
RSi .
Proof. (Sketch) Assume the adversary claims an incorrect dedu-
plication level dli′F . If dl
i′
F < dl
i
F, an honest user will accept the
server’s proof with negligible probability neg(λ) ≤ 2−λ/2, where λ
is the image length of the collision resistant hash function W. The
collision resistance property of W prevents A of computing a set of
leaves lF,rlU ′ different than the correct set of leaves l
F,rl
U with the same
root digest hF,rl0 . Otherwise, A can be used to break W’s collision
resistance.
An economically motivated adversary will never claim dli′F > dl
i
F,
as this implies a higher deduplication level than the real one, and
individual users whose data are deduplicated will be charged less
than they should.
□
8 CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that two seemingly contradictory notions,
replication and deduplication, can be reconciled without violating
the security guarantees of outsourced storage. Our solution, ReDup,
leverages time-consuming replica generation to tolerate collusions
between users and a rational CSP that tries to cheat by storing
less replicas than agreed upon with its clients. Moreover, ReDup
provides transparent deduplication for multiple replicas, thus pre-
venting a malicious CSP from claiming that it deduplicates less
files than it actually does. ReDup does this in a scalable manner by
presenting to clients a proof that has a constant size regardless of
the number of replica servers. This enables a new pricing model
which takes into account the level of deduplication of the data: The
more users store the same piece of data, the lower each individual
user gets charged for storing that piece of data.
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